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Abstract
We present a North—South model of international trade in which diﬀerenti-
ated products are developed in the North. Sectors are populated by ﬁnal-good
producers who diﬀer in productivity levels. Based on productivity and sectoral
characteristics, ﬁrms decide whether to integrate into the production of inter-
mediate inputs or outsource them. In either case they have to decide from
which country to source the inputs. Final-good producers and their suppliers
must make relationship-speciﬁc investments, both in an integrated ﬁrm and in
an arm’s-length relationship. We describe an equilibrium in which ﬁrms with
diﬀerent productivity levels choose diﬀerent ownership structures and supplier
locations, i.e., they choose diﬀerent organizational forms. We then study the
eﬀects of within-sectoral heterogeneity and variations in industry characteristics
on the relative prevalence of these organizational forms. The analysis sheds light
on the structure of foreign trade within and across industries.
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rights, Multinational ﬁrms.
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A ﬁrm that chooses to keep the production of an intermediate input within its bound-
aries can produce it at home or in a foreign country. When it keeps it at home, it
engages in standard vertical integration. And when it makes it abroad, it engages in
foreign direct investment (FDI) and intra-ﬁrm trade. Alternatively, a ﬁrm may choose
to outsource an input in the home country or in a foreign country. When it buys
the input at home, it engages in domestic outsourcing. And when it buys it abroad,
it engages in arm’s-length trade. Intel Corporation provides an example of the FDI
strategy; it assembles most of its microchips in wholly-owned subsidiaries in China,
Costa Rica, Malaysia, and the Philippines. On the other hand, Nike provides an ex-
ample of the arm’s-length import strategy; it subcontracts most of its manufacturing
to independent producers in Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Growth of international specialization has been a dominant feature of the inter-
national economy. Amongst the many examples that illustrate this trend, two are
particularly telling. Citing Tempest (1996), Feenstra (1998) illustrates Mattel’s global
sourcing strategy in the production of its star product, the Barbie doll. “Of the $2
export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for the United States,” he writes,
“about 35 cents covers Chinese labor, 65 cents covers the cost of materials,” – which
are imported from Taiwan, Japan, and the United States – “and the remainder covers
transportation and overheads, including proﬁts earned in Hong Kong” (pp.35-36). The
World Trade Organization provides another example in its 1998 annual report. In the
production of an “American” car, 30 percent of the car’s value originates in Korea,
1 7 . 5p e r c e n ti nJ a p a n ,7 . 5p e r c e n ti nG e r m a n y ,4p e r c e n ti nT a i w a na n dS i n g a p o r e ,
2.5 percent in the U.K., and 1.5 percent in Ireland and Barbados. That is, “...only 37
percent of the production value... is generated in the United States” (p.36).
Importantly, the increasing international disintegration of production is large enough
to be noticed in aggregate statistics. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) use U.S. input—output
tables to infer U.S. imports of intermediate inputs. They ﬁnd that the share of im-
ported intermediates increased from 5.3% of total U.S. intermediate purchases in 1972
to 11.6% in 1990. Campa and Goldberg (1997) ﬁnd similar evidence for Canada and
the U.K. (but not for Japan). Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), who use a narrower
concept of international specialization, i.e., the fraction of imported inputs embodied
in the production of goods destined for export, ﬁnd that in 9 OECD countries and 4
1emerging market economies this fraction increased – by almost 30% on average –
between 1970 and 1990 (again, not in Japan).1
B u th o wi m p o r t a n ti si n t r a - ﬁrm relative to arm’s-length trade in intermediate in-
puts? A ﬁrm-level data analysis is needed to answer this question, and no such analysis
is available at this point in time. And despite the fact that the business press has
stressed the spectacular growth of foreign outsourcing, Hanson, Mataloni and Slaugh-
ter (2002) document an equally impressive growth of trade within multinational ﬁrms.
Nevertheless, the fact that imports from foreign aﬃliates of U.S.-based ﬁrms has fallen
from 23.9% of total U.S. imports in 1977 to 16.3% in 1999, suggests that foreign out-
sourcing might have outpaced foreign intra-ﬁrm sourcing by U.S. ﬁrms.2
Other studies have documented a rise in the prevalence of domestic outsourcing by
U.S. ﬁrms. The Economist (1991), Bamford (1994) and Abraham and Taylor (1996),
all report rising subcontracting in particular industries or activities. A systematic
analysis of this trend is not available. Nevertheless, Figure 1 provides indirect evidence
of a decline in vertical integration. The average number of four-digit SIC segments in
which a U.S. publicly-traded manufacturing company operates, declined from 2.72 in
1In related work, Yeats (2001) constructs a direct measure of trade in components, taking advantage
of a recent revision of the Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) system. His data for
machinery and transport equipment suggest that, between 1978 and 1995, international trade in
components has grown at a faster rate than international trade in ﬁnal-stage products.
2
Table 1. Foreign insourcing
Year Imports from Total U.S. Share of
foreign aﬃliates imports foreign insourcing
by U.S. parents in U.S. imports
1977 36,266 151,534 23.9
1982 39,288 243,952 16.1
1989 74,738 473,211 15.8
1994 114,881 663,256 17.3
1999 166,990 1,024,618 16.3
Sources: BEA Direct Investment data set and U.S. Census
Table 1 reports data for the ﬁve years in which the BEA conducted comprehensive surveys on the
universe of U.S. ﬁrms engaging in foreign direct investment. As is evident from the table, the large
drop in the share of insourcing occurred sometime between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, and
it remained relatively constant during the last 20 years. This share is only a rough measure of the
relative importance of foreign insourcing, however, because both the numerator and the denominator








































Figure 1: The average number of four-digit SIC segments in which ﬁrms operate.
1979 to 1.81 in 1997.3 The ﬁgure suggests that U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms have become
increasingly specialized, which indicates a trend towards less vertical integration.
To address issues that arise from the choice of outsourcing versus integration and
home versus foreign production, we need a theoretical framework in which companies
make endogenous organizational choices. We propose such a framework in this paper
by integrating two recent strands of the literature.
Melitz (2002) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) have studied the eﬀects
of within sectoral heterogeneity on the decisions of ﬁrms to serve foreign markets. By
allowing productivity to diﬀer across ﬁrms, they show that low-productivity ﬁrms serve
the domestic market but not foreign markets, while high-productivity ﬁrms also serve
foreign markets. Allowing for horizontal foreign direct investment, Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple also showed that, amongst the ﬁrms that serve foreign markets, the more
productive ones engage in foreign direct investment while the less productive ﬁrms
3The data for this ﬁgure are taken from Fan and Lang (2000), who constructed it from the Com-
pustat data set. One might worry that the trend in Figure 1 is driven by a composition eﬀect, i.e., by
a relative increase in the number of ﬁrms in relatively specialized manufacturing sectors. To examine
this possibility, we regressed the four-digit SIC segments per ﬁrm on a time trend and ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient on the time trend was negative, with a T-statistic of −66.93. We interpret this
to imply that ﬁrms specialized more over time.
3export. Importantly, aﬃliate sales relative to exports are larger in sectors with more
productivity dispersion. Their approach emphasized variations across ﬁrms within
industries, without addressing the organizational choices of ﬁr m st h a tn e e dt oa c q u i r e
intermediate inputs.
Grossman and Helpman (2002a) addressed the choice between outsourcing and in-
tegration in a one-input general equilibrium framework, assuming that all ﬁrms of a
given type are equally productive. Their ﬁrms face the friction of incomplete contracts
in arm’s-length relationships, which they weigh against the less-eﬃcient production
of inputs in integrated companies. As a result, some sectors have only vertically in-
tegrated ﬁrms while others have only disintegrated ﬁrms. Grossman and Helpman
identify sectoral characteristics that lead to one or the other equilibrium structure.
This approach has been extended by Antràs (2002a) to a trading environment, by in-
troducing two important new features. First, the friction of incomplete contracts also
exists within integrated ﬁrms, and – as in Grossman and Hart (1986) – integration
provides well deﬁned property rights. However, these property rights may or may not
give integration an advantage over outsourcing. Second, there are two inputs, one con-
trolled by the ﬁnal-good producer, the other by another supplier, inside or outside the
ﬁrm. The relative intensity of these inputs tu r n so u tt ob ea ni m p o r t a n td e t e r m i n a n t
of the choice between integration and outsourcing.
By embodying this structure in a Helpman and Krugman (1985) style two-sector
general equilibrium model of trading countries, Antràs shows that the sector that is
relatively intensive in the input controlled by the ﬁnal-good producers integrates, while
the sector that is relatively intensive in the other input outsources. As a result, in the
former sector there is intra-ﬁrm trade in inputs, while in the latter sector there is
arm’s-length trade.
Building on this literature, we develop a theoretical model that combines the within-
sectoral heterogeneity of Melitz (2002) with the structure of ﬁrms in Antràs (2002a).
The ﬁnal-good producer controls the supply of headquarter services while an operator of
the production facility of intermediate inputs controls their production. This allows us
to explore the joint variations within and across sectors, i.e., productivity within sectors
and technological and organizational features across sectors, in shaping organizational
forms, trade and foreign direct investment. In particular, we show that in a world of
two countries, North and South, in which ﬁnal-good producers are based in the North,
4ﬁnal-good producers who operate in the same sector but diﬀer by productivity sort
into integrated companies that produce inputs in the North (do not engage in foreign
trade), integrated companies that produce inputs in the South (engage in FDI and
intra-ﬁrm trade), disintegrated companies that outsource in the North (do not engage
in foreign trade), and disintegrated companies that outsource in the South (import
inputs at arm’s length).
We show that in low-headquarter-intensive sectors ﬁrms do not integrate; low-
productivity ﬁrms outsource in the North while high-productivity ﬁrms outsource in
the South. In sectors with high headquarter intensity all four organizational forms
emerge in equilibrium. Importantly, high-productivity ﬁrms import inputs while low-
productivity ﬁrms acquire them in the North. However, amongst the ﬁrms that ac-
quire inputs in the same country, the low-productivity ﬁrms outsource while the high-
productivity ﬁr m si n t e g r a t e .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h el e a s t - p r o d u c t i v eﬁrms outsource in
the North while the most productive ﬁrms integrate in the South via foreign direct
investment.
We use the model to study the relative prevalence of diﬀerent organizational forms.
W es h o wh o wp r e v a l e n c ed e p e n d so nt h ew a g eg a pb e t w e e nt h eN o r t ha n dt h eS o u t h ,
the trading costs of intermediate inputs, the degree of productivity dispersion within a
sector, the distribution of bargaining power, the size of the ownership advantage (which
may be diﬀerent in the two countries), and the intensity of headquarter services. Our
model predicts that relatively more ﬁnal-good producers rely on imported intermediates
in sectors with higher productivity dispersion or lower headquarter intensity. And in
sectors with integration and outsourcing, which are the sectors with high headquarter
intensity, industries with higher productivity dispersion have relatively more ﬁnal-good
producers who integrate. This is true for a comparison of integration versus outsourcing
in each of the countries. As a result, such sectors have more intra-ﬁr mt r a d er e l a t i v et o
arm’s-length trade. These results illustrate the types of issues that can be addressed
with our model.
Our model is developed in the next section. In section 3 we characterize an indus-
try’s equilibrium. Then, in section 4, we describe the equilibrium sorting of ﬁrms into
diﬀerent organizational forms, and we study in section 5 the prevalence of each mode
of organization. This is also the section that examines the eﬀects of variations within
and across sectors on the relative prevalence of organizational forms. Section 6 oﬀers
5a short summary with concluding comments.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a world with two countries, the North and the South, and a unique factor
of production, labor. The world is populated by a unit measure of consumers with
identical preferences represented by:







j , 0 <µ<1,
where x0 is consumption of a homogeneous good, Xj is an index of aggregate consump-








of the consumption of diﬀerent varieties xj(i), where the range of i will be endogenously
determined. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties in a given sector
is 1/(1 − α). We assume that α>µ , so that varieties within a sector are more
substitutable for each other than they are substitutable for x0 or for varieties from a






In every country the diﬀerentiated product sectors are assumed to be small relative
to the size of the local labor market. As a result, producers in these sectors face a
perfectly elastic supply of labor.4 We denote by wN t h ew a g er a t ei nt h eN o r t ha n db y
wS the wage rate in the South. These wage rates are ﬁxed and wN >w S.5
The demand parameters µ and α are the same in every industry, which helps to
focus attention on cross-sectoral diﬀerences in technology and cross-country diﬀerences
in organizational costs. Our aim is to explore how diﬀerences in technology interact
4A simple way to ensure this property is to assume that there is a continuum of sectors j rather
than a ﬁnite number.
5The assumption of ﬁxed wage rates and a higher wage rate in the North can be justiﬁed in general
equilibrium by assuming that w  is the productivity of labor in producing x0 in country  ,   = N,S,
and that labor supply is large enough in every country so that both countries produce x0.
6with organizational choices in shaping industrial structure, trade ﬂows and FDI.
Only the North has the know-how to produce ﬁnal-good varieties in the non-
homogeneous sectors. To start producing a variety in sector j a ﬁrm needs to bear
a ﬁxed cost of entry consisting of fE units of Northern labor. Upon paying this ﬁxed
cost, the unique producer of variety i in sector j draws a productivity level θ from
a known distribution G(θ).6 After observing this productivity level, the ﬁnal-good
producer decides whether to exit the market or start producing; in the latter case an
additional ﬁxed cost of organizing production needs to be incurred. As discussed below,
this additional ﬁxed cost is a function of the structure of ownership and the location
of production.
Production of any ﬁnal-good variety requires a combination of two variety-speciﬁc
and freely tradable intermediate inputs, hj (i) and mj (i), which we associate with
headquarter services and manufactured components, respectively. Output of every









, 0 <η j < 1.( 2 )
Notice that, up to the productivity parameter θ, the technology is identical for all
v a r i e t i e si nag i v e ns e c t o r ,b u ts e c t o r sd i ﬀer in the relative intensity of headquarter
services, as represented by ηj. The larger is ηj the more intensive is the sector in
headquarter services.
The unit cost function for producing intermediate inputs is identical in all sectors
but varies by country. Production of one unit of headquarter services hj (i) in the
North requires one unit of Northern labor, while the South is much less eﬃcient at
producing headquarter services. We assume that the productivity advantage of the
North is so large that headquarter services are only produced in the North. On the
other hand, production of one unit of mj (i) requires one unit of labor in the North
and in the South.
There are two types of producers: ﬁnal-good producers and operators of manufac-
turing plants for components. Only ﬁnal-good producers have the know-how to produce
headquarter services. On the other hand, every ﬁnal-good producer needs to contract
with a manufacturing-plant operator for the provision of components. We allow inter-
6We can accommodate sectoral diﬀerences in the ﬁxed cost fE and the distribution G(θ),b u tc h o s e
them to be identical for simplicity.
7national fragmentation of the production process, so that the ﬁnal-good producer can
choose to transact with a manufacturing plant in the North or in the South.
It follows from our assumptions that ﬁnal-good producers locate inthe North. Upon
paying the ﬁxed cost of entry wNfE and observing the productivity level θ, the unique
ﬁnal-good producer of variety i in sector j decides whether to match with an operator
of a manufacturing plant in the North or with one in the South. Simultaneously, the
ﬁnal-good producer chooses whether to vertically-integrate the manufacturing plant or
engage instead in an arm’s-length transaction.
We specify a very simple matching technology. After paying the ﬁxed cost of search
in a given market, a ﬁnal-good producer ﬁnds a match with probability one. We assume
that ﬁnal-good producers in the North need to incur a higher ﬁxed cost to search in
the unfamiliar South than in the familiar North. We also assume that the status quo
is for the ﬁrms to remain non integrated. In addition to the search costs, a ﬁnal good
producer incurs management and negotiation costs that depend on the organizational
form. All these costs, the sum of which we term ﬁxed organizational costs,a r ei nt e r m s
of Northern labor. We denote them by wNf 
k,w h e r ek is an index of the ownership
structure and   is an index of the country in which the manufacturing of components
takes place.
The ownership structure takes one of two forms: vertical integration V or outsourc-
ing O. The location of the manufacturing of components is in one of two sites: in the
North N or in the South S.T h e r e f o r ek ∈ {V,O} and   ∈ {N,S}.A norganizational
form consists of an ownership structure and a location for the production of compo-
nents. Because the status quo is for the ﬁnal-good producer to be non-integrated, we
assume that the ﬁxed organizational costs are higher for a vertically integrated ﬁrm,
no matter in which country it owns the manufacturing plant for components. Namely,
f 
V >f  
O for   = N,S.7 Note that when a ﬁnal-good producer owns a manufacturing
plant of components in the North this represents a standard situation of vertical inte-
gration. On the other hand, when a ﬁnal-good producer owns the manufacturing plant
of components in the South, this represents vertical foreign direct investment (FDI).
We ﬁnally assume that the ﬁxed organizational costs are higher in the South, be-
7One can imagine situations in which this may not be the case. Nevertheless, we believe that this
assumption is appropriate in many instances, and we therefore maintain it in the main analysis. It is
not diﬃcult, however, to see how various results change when outsourcing requires higher ﬁxed costs.
We shall point out how some of the results diﬀer in this case.
8cause the ﬁxed costs of search, monitoring, and communication are higher in the foreign
country. Combined with the assumption that integration entails higher costs of orga-









O .( 3 )
The location of the manufacturing of components and the mode of ownership are
chosen ex-ante by the ﬁnal-good producer to maximize the joint value of the relation-
ship, as measured by the sum of the operating proﬁts of the ﬁnal-good producer and
the manufacturing plant net of all ﬁxed costs of production. This can be justiﬁed by
assuming that the ﬁnal-good producer sets a fee for participation in the relationship
that has to be paid by the operator of the manufacturing plant. This fee can be pos-
itive or negative, i.e., the operator can make a payment to the ﬁnal good producer
or vice versa. The purpose of the fee is to secure the participation of the operator
in the relationship at minimum cost to the ﬁnal-good producer. When the supply of
operators of manufacturing plants is inﬁnitely elastic, the operator’s proﬁts from the
relationship net of the participation fee are equal in equilibrium to his outside option.8
For simplicity, we set the operators’ outside option equal to zero. It is, however, easy
t oe x t e n dt h ea n a l y s i st oc a s e si nw h i c ht h e s eo u t s i d eo p t i o n sa r ep o s i t i v ea n dd i ﬀerent
in the North and in the South.
The setting is one of incomplete contracts. Final-good producers and manufacturing-
plant operators cannot sign ex-ante enforceable contracts specifying the purchase of
specialized intermediate inputs for a certain price. In addition, the parties cannot
write enforceable contracts contingent on the amount of labor hired or on the volume
of sales revenues obtained when the ﬁnal good is sold. One can use arguments of the
type developed by Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999) to justify this speciﬁcation.
Namely, that the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate an initial contract and that
the precise nature of the required input is revealed only ex-post, and it is not veriﬁable
by a third party. To simplify the analysis, we just impose these constraints on the
contracting environment.
Because no enforceable contract can be signed ex-ante, ﬁnal-good producers and
manufacturing-plant operators bargain over the surplus from the relationship after the
inputs have been produced. We model this ex-post bargaining as a Generalized Nash
8See Antràs (2002a,b) for more details.
9Bargaining game in which the ﬁnal-good producer obtains a fraction β ∈ (0,1) of the
ex-post gains from the relationship.9
Following the property-rights approach to the theory of the ﬁr m ,w ea s s u m et h a t
ex-post bargaining takes place both under outsourcing and under integration. The
distribution of surplus is sensitive, however, to the mode of organization. More specif-
ically, the outside option for a ﬁnal-good producer is assumed to be diﬀerent when
it owns the manufacturing plant than when it does not. In the latter case, a failure
to reach an agreement on the distribution of the surplus leaves both parties with no
income, because the inputs are tailored speciﬁcally to the other party in the transac-
tion. However, by vertically integrating the production of components, the ﬁnal-good
producer is eﬀectively buying the right to ﬁre the operator of the manufacturing plant
and seize the inputs mj(i). If there were no costs associated with ﬁring the operator
of the manufacturing plant, the ﬁnal-good producer would always have an incentive
to seize the inputs mj (i) ex-post, and the manufacturing-plant operator would have
an incentive to choose mj (i)=0ex-ante (which of course would imply xj (i)=0 ).
In this case integration would never be chosen. We therefore assume that ﬁring the
manufacturing-plant operator results in a loss of a fraction 1 − δ
  of ﬁnal-good pro-
duction.10 We also assume that δ
N >δ
S. This captures the notion that a contractual
breach is likely to be more costly for the ﬁnal-good producer when the manufacturing
plant is located in the South.
3 Equilibrium
Consider the payoﬀs in the bargaining game for a pair of ﬁrms producing in sector j.
Since from now on we discuss a particular sector, we drop for simplicity the index j
from all the variables. If the parties agree in the bargaining, the potential revenue from













9This speciﬁcation is similar to Grossman and Helpman (2002a) and Antràs (2002a,b).
10The fact that the fraction of ﬁnal-good production lost is independent of ηj greatly simpliﬁes the
analysis, but it is not necessary for the qualitative results discussed below.
10If they fail to agree, however, the outside option for the manufacturing-plant operator
is always 0 w h i l et h a tf o rt h eﬁnal-good producer varies with the ownership structure
and the location of components manufacturing.
When the ﬁnal-good producer outsources components, its outside option is also
0 regardless of the location of the manufacturing plant. In this event the ﬁnal-good
producer gets βR(i) while the manufacturing-plant operator gets (1 − β)R(i).
The ﬁnal-good producer has more leverage under vertical integration. When the
parties fail to reach an agreement, the ﬁnal-good producer can sell an amount δ
 x(i)










R(i).I n t h e











R(i), while the operator of the manufacturing







Notice that the payoﬀs in the bargaining game are proportional to the revenue.
Denoting by β
 
kR(i) the payoﬀ of the ﬁnal-good producer under ownership structure k
































O = β.( 5 )
That is, ﬁnal-good producers are able to appropriate higher fractions of revenue under
integration than under outsourcing, with this fraction being higher when integration
takes place in the North.
Since the delivery of the inputs h(i) and m(i) is not contractible ex-ante, the par-
ties choose their quantities noncooperatively; every supplier maximizes its own pay-
oﬀ. In particular, the ﬁnal-good producer provides an amount of headquarter services
that maximizes β
 
kR(i) − wNh(i) while the manufacturing-plant operator provides an






R(i) − w m(i). Combining the ﬁrst-
order conditions of these two programs, using (4), the total value of the relationship,






































´1−η¸α/(1−α) .( 7 )
Note that among the arguments of the proﬁt function π 
k (θ,X,η),t h eﬁrst one is ﬁrm-
speciﬁc while the others are industry-speciﬁc. Moreover, while η is a parameter, the
consumption index X is endogenous to the industry but exogenous to the producer of
a speciﬁcv a r i e t yo ft h eﬁnal good.
Upon observing its productivity level θ,aﬁnal-good producer either pays the ﬁxed
organizational cost wNf 
k and chooses the ownership structure and the location of
manufacturing that maximizes (6), or exits the industry and forfeits the ﬁxed cost of
entry wNfE. It is clear from (6) that the latter occurs whenever θ is below a threshold
θ, denoted by θ ∈ (0,∞), at which the operating proﬁts





equal zero. Namely, θ is implicitly deﬁned by
π(θ,X,η)=0 . (9)
This threshold productivity level depends on the sector’s aggregate consumption index
X, i.e., θ(X).
In solving the problem on the right-hand-side of (8), a ﬁnal-good producer eﬀec-




k,w  ,f 
k
¢
that maximizes (6). It is straightforward to see
that π 
k (θ,X,η) is decreasing in both w  and f 
k. For this reason ﬁnal-good producers
prefer to organize production so as to minimize both variable and ﬁxed costs. On
account of variable costs, Southern manufacturing is preferred to Northern manufac-
turing regardless of the ownership structure (because wN >w S). On account of ﬁxed
costs, however, the ranking of proﬁtl e v e l si st h er e v e r s eo ft h er a n k i n go fﬁxed cost
levels in (3).
Next note that if the ﬁnal-good producer could freely choose its fraction of revenue
β
 
k,i tw o u l dc h o o s eβ
∗ ∈ [0,1] that maximizes ψ
 
k (η).T h i sf r a c t i o ni s
β
∗ (η)=
η(αη +1− α) −
p
η(1 − η)(1− αη)(αη +1− α)
2η − 1
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Figure 2: The Proﬁt-Maximizing Distribution of Revenue
Although a higher β
 
k gives the ﬁnal-good producer a larger fraction of the revenue, it
also induces the supplier of components to produce fewer components. As a result, the
ﬁnal-good producer trades the choice of a larger fraction of the revenue for a smaller
revenue level.
The function β
∗ (η) is depicted by the solid curve in Figure 2. It rises in η; β
∗ (0) = 0
and β
∗ (1) = 1.11 To understand these properties, notice that in the ex-post bargaining
neither the ﬁnal-good producer nor the manufacturing-plant operator appropriate the
full marginal return to their investments in the supply of headquarter services and
components, respectively. This leads them to underinvest in the provision of these
inputs. Each party’s severity of underinvestment is inversely related to the fraction of
the surplus that it appropriates. Ex-ante eﬃciency then requires giving a larger share
of the revenue to the party undertaking the relatively more important investment. As
a result, the higher the intensity of headquarter services (the larger is η), the higher is
the proﬁt-maximizing fraction of the surplus accruing to the ﬁnal-good producer (the
higher is β
∗).
11Notice also that it does not depend on factor prices and that it is less nonlinear the higher is α.
13Following Grossman and Hart (1986), we do not allow a free ex-ante choice of the
division rule of the surplus. The choice of ownership structure and the location of
the manufacturing of components are the only instruments for aﬀecting the division















.W h e n η is close to 1,h i g h e rv a l u e so fβ
 
k yield higher proﬁts.
Given the ordering in (5), this implies that the ﬁnal-good producer would have chosen
domestic integration if there were no other diﬀerences in the costs and beneﬁts of the
competing organizational forms. Conversely, when η is close to 0,l o w e rv a l u e so fβ
 
k
yield higher proﬁts, and the ﬁnal-good producer would have chosen outsourcing in the
absence of other diﬀerences in the costs and beneﬁts of the organizational forms.
Naturally, there are other diﬀerences in the costs and beneﬁts of various organi-
zational forms. As a result, the proﬁt-maximizing choice of an ownership structure
and the location of the manufacturing of components depends on a ﬁrm’s productivity
level. When θ is small, changes in β
 
k and w  have small eﬀects on proﬁts, because
changes in ψ
 
k (η) have small eﬀects on proﬁts (see (6) and (7)). Under the circum-
stances diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs dominate the choice of an organizational form, which
gives domestic outsourcing a particular advantage. On the other hand, when θ is large,
ﬁxed costs are less important, and the combinations of β
 
k and w  that raise ψ
 
k (η) as
much as possible are particularly advantageous. We shall see in the next section how
these tradoﬀsp l a yo u t .
Free entry ensures that, in equilibrium, the expected operating proﬁts of a potential
entrant equal the ﬁxed cost of entry. From the discussion above, a ﬁrm in sector j that
draws a productivity level below θ(X) chooses to exit, because its operating proﬁts
are negative. On the other hand, ﬁrms with θ ≥ θ(X) stay in the industry, and they
choose organizational forms that maximize their proﬁts. Under the circumstances the




NfE.( 1 1 )
This condition provides an implicit solution to the sector’s real consumption index
X. Using the sector’s consumption index, it is then possible to calculate all other
variables of interest, such as the threshold productivity level of surviving entrants, the
organizational forms of ﬁnal-good producers with diﬀerent productivity levels, and the
number of entrants.
14In order to gain insights into the prevalence of alternative organizational forms
and into how they diﬀer across sectors, we focus in what follows on two types of
sectors: those with relatively high headquarter intensity and those with relatively low
headquarter intensity. Our aim is to characterize the diﬀerences in organizational forms
between these sector types. Intermediate factor intensities can be similarly analyzed,
but they are more complex and provide no new insights.
4O r g a n i z a t i o n a l F o r m s






O = β. For concreteness, we refer to it as a low-tech sector. This case is depicted in
Figure 2 by η = ηL, where the arrows indicate the direction in which proﬁts rise with
changes in β
 
k.12 Components are particularly important in the production process of
a low-tech sector and the proﬁts of ﬁrms in this type of sector are decreasing in the
fraction of revenue that accrues to the ﬁnal-good producer. On this account, proﬁts
are highest under outsourcing (both domestic and foreign) and lowest under domestic
integration. In addition, the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing are lower than the ﬁxed costs of
integration. Therefore a ﬁnal-good producer in a low-tech sector never integrates into
manufacturing of components. In choosing between domestic outsourcing and foreign
outsourcing, however, such a producer trades-oﬀ the lower variable costs of Southern
manufacturing against the lower ﬁxed organizational costs in the North.
Two types of equilibria exist in this case. Which type applies depends on whether
the cross-country diﬀerence in the wage rate is large or small relative to the cross-
country diﬀerence in the ﬁxed organizational costs of outsourcing. Figure 3 depicts
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ew a g ed i ﬀerential is small relative to the ﬁxed-cost diﬀerential.13
The transformed measure of productivity θ
α/(1−α) is measured along the horizontal axis
while operating proﬁts are measured along the vertical axis. It is evident from (6) that
the operating proﬁts π 
k are linear in θ
α/(1−α), with the slope being proportional to ψ
 
k (η)
and the intercept being equal to −wNf 
k.T h eﬁgure depicts proﬁts from outsourcing
only, because in a low-tech sector proﬁts from outsourcing in country   are higher than
proﬁts from integration in country  .N o t e a l s o t h a t p r o ﬁts from outsourcing in the
12Note that the following analysis applies to every industry in which β
∗ (η) <β ; this is necessarily
t h ec a s ew h e nη is low enough.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium in the Low-Tech Sector
South have a steeper slope than proﬁts from outsourcing in the North, because wages





Firms with productivity below θL expect negative proﬁts under all organizational
forms. Therefore they exit the industry. Firms with productivity between θL and θ
N
LO
attain the highest proﬁts by outsourcing in the North while ﬁrms with productivity
above θ
N
LO attain the highest proﬁts by outsourcing in the South.15 The cutoﬀs θL and
θ
N

























It is also clear from Figure 3 that the intersection point of the two proﬁt lines takes
place at a negative proﬁt level when the ﬁxed organizational costs of outsourcing in
the South are close to the ﬁxed organizational costs of outsourcing in the North.16 In







15The upper envelope of the proﬁt lines in Figure 3 represent the proﬁtf u n c t i o nπ(θ,X,η) (from
(8)) for low-tech sectors.






16this case the threshold productivity level θL is deﬁned by the point of intersection of
the proﬁtl i n eπS
O with the horizontal axis. As a result, all ﬁrms with productivity
below this threshold exit while all ﬁrms with higher productivity levels outsource in
the South. Evidently, in this equilibrium no ﬁrm outsources in the North.
We shall treat the case described in Figure 3 as the generic case of a low-tech sector.




















































Equations (12) and (13) provide implicit solutions for the cutoﬀs θL and θLO and for
the aggregate consumption index X.




We refer to it as a high-tech sector. A sector of this type is represented by η = ηH in
Figure 2. In this sector proﬁts are increasing in the fraction of revenue β
 
k,a ss h o w n
by the arrows in the ﬁgure. In a high-tech sector the marginal product of headquarter
services is high, making underinvestment by ﬁnal-good producers especially costly. As
a result, ex-ante maximization of value favors integration over outsourcing as long as
there are no other diﬀerences in the beneﬁts and costs of alternative organizational





  = N,S. Namely, in every country the slope of the proﬁt function is steeper when the
ﬁrm is vertically integrated than when it outsources components.
Now compare the slope of the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fa ni n t e g r a t e dﬁrm that produces
components in the North with the slope of the proﬁtf u n c t i o no faﬁrm that outsources
its components in the South, where the slope is measured relative to the θ
α/(1−α) axis
(see Figure 4). The integrated ﬁrm has the advantage of being able to save a positive
fraction δ
N of output when it severs its ties with the operator of the production facility
of components, while the outsourcing ﬁrm saves no output at all when it severs its ties
with the arm’s-length supplier of components. On the other hand, the integrated ﬁrm
faces higher production costs, because the wage rate is higher in the North. For these
reasons the proﬁt function of the ﬁrm outsourcing in the South can be steeper or ﬂatter
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Figure 4: Equilibrium in the Hi-Tech Sector
is small or large, respectively, relative to the wage diﬀerential. That is, ψ
S
O(η) can be
larger or smaller than ψ
N
V (η).
First consider the case in which the wage diﬀerential is large relative to δ














O(η).( 1 4 )
Given the ordering in (3) and (14), the order of the intercepts and the slopes of the
proﬁt functions are as depicted in Figure 4. The intersection point of πN
O with the
horizontal axis is to the left of the intersection point of this proﬁt line with πN
V ,t h e
latter intersection point is to the left of the intersection point of πN
V with πS
O,a n dt h i s



























{1 − α[βη +( 1− β)(1− η)]}
(1−α)/α β
η (1 − β)
1−η
(see (7)). This inequality always holds in low-tech sectors (in which the right-hand-side is smaller
than one), but may not hold in high-tech sectors (in which the right-hand-side is larger than one).
18last intersection point is to the left of the intersection point of πS
O with πS
V.W et a k e
this situation to be the generic case of a high-tech sector. In this case all ﬁrms with
productivity below θH exit the industry, those with productivity between θH and θ
N
HO









HO outsource in the South, and
those with productivity above θ
S
HO integrate in the South (engage in vertical FDI).
It is easy to see that either one of the ﬁrst three organizational forms may not exist
in equilibrium, but that the last one always exists. That is, there always exist high-
productivity ﬁnal-good producers who choose to manufacture components in the South.
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(15)
We can also use the free entry condition (11) to derive an equation that is analogous
to (13). This equation together with (15) can then be used to solve for the cutoﬀsa n d
the consumption index X.18




V (η), i.e., the proﬁt function from in-
tegration in the North has a larger slope than the proﬁt function from outsourcing
18Suppose instead that the ﬁxed costs of outsourcing are higher than the ﬁxed costs of integration
in each one of the countries, but that the ﬁxed costs of integration in the South are higher than the
ﬁxed costs of outsourcing in the North. Then, in a high-tech sector integration dominates outsourcing
in each one of the countries, because the ﬁxed costs of integration are lower than the ﬁxed costs of
outsourcing and the proﬁtf u n c t i o no fa ni n t e g r a t e dﬁrm is steeper than the proﬁt function of an
outsourcing ﬁrm. As a result, no ﬁrm outsources. Amongst the ﬁnal-good producers who stay in the
industry, low-productivity ﬁrms integrate in the North while high-productivity ﬁrms integrate in the
South. The reversal of the ordering of the ﬁxed costs also aﬀects the sorting of ﬁrms by organizational
form in low-tech sectors. Now, in a low-tech sector integration may dominate outsourcing at certain
productivity levels. In particular, the least productive ﬁnal-good producers who stay in the industry
may integrate in the North, some more productive ﬁrms may outsource in the North, still higher-
productivity ﬁrms may integrate in the South, and the most productive ﬁrms outsource in the South.
19in the South. This happens when the wage diﬀerential is small relative to δ
N.19 In


















case arises when the wage diﬀerential is small relative to δ
N, but not so small relative
to the diﬀerence between δ
N and δ
S. On the other hand, the latter case arises when
t h ew a g ed i ﬀerential is small even relative to the diﬀerence between δ
N and δ
S.I f ,f o r
example, the wage rates are almost identical, then the fact that an integrated ﬁnal-
good producer in the North can save a larger fraction of output than an integrated
ﬁnal-good producer in the South can when both sever their ties with the components
manufacturers, makes the former’s proﬁts more sensitive to productivity changes than













O(η), integration in the North
dominates outsourcing in the South, because it has lower ﬁxed costs of organization
and higher proﬁts per unit productivity θ.N a m e l y , t h e p r o ﬁt line πN
V in Figure 4
has a higher intercept and a larger slope than πS
O.I n t h i s e v e n t n o ﬁrm chooses to
outsource in the South, and the model predicts that – amongst the ﬁrms that do not
exit the industry – low-productivity ﬁrms outsource in the North, high-productivity
ﬁrms integrate in the South, and ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels integrate
in the North.








O(η), integration in the
North dominates both outsourcing in the South and integration in the South. As a
result, at most two organizational forms survive in equilibrium: low-productivity ﬁrms
that outsource in the North and high-productivity ﬁrms that integrate in the North.
We have characterized the organizational forms in low-tech and high-tech sectors.
The choice of organizational forms by ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels is depicted
in Figure 5. This ﬁgure describes the generic cases. First, low-tech ﬁrms do not
integrate into the production of components; low-productivity ﬁrms outsource them
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Figure 5: Organizational Forms
productive ﬁrms exit. On the other hand, integration always takes place in high-tech
sectors. The most productive ﬁrms integrate in the South via foreign direct investment
while somewhat less productive ﬁrms outsource in the South. Firms with even lower
productivity acquire components in the North. Amongst those, the more productive
ﬁrms integrate while the less productive outsource. The least productivity ﬁrms exit.
Note that surviving ﬁr m sw i t ht h el o w e s tp r o d u c t i v i t yo u t s o u r c ei nt h eN o r t hi nb o t h
low-tech and high-tech sectors. And more generally, less productive ﬁrms acquire
components in the North while more productive ﬁrms acquire them in the South.
This sorting pattern diﬀers from the sorting pattern derived by Grossman and
Helpman (2002b) for organizational structures that use managerial incentives à la
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994).21 Contrary to our results, in their model surviv-
ing low-productivity ﬁrms acquire components in the South. Within this group less-
productive ﬁrms outsource while more-productivity ﬁrms integrate via FDI. While no
one outsources inputs in the North, there exist modestly-high productive ﬁrms that
integrate in the North. However, the most-productive ﬁrms, like the least-productive
ﬁrms, outsource in the South.
Evidently, the two models predict very diﬀerent sorting patterns. It would be
interesting and useful to gauge which pattern better ﬁts reality. There exists, however,
no evidence that bears directly on this question. And it is hard to see how to test these
predictions with the available data.
It also is important to bear in mind that the most suitable theory of the ﬁrm can
diﬀer across sectors. Namely, the Grossman-Hart property-rights approach may be
21They did not distinguish between low- and high-tech sectors, however, although one can interpret
their production technology as having η =0 , i.e., a zero output elasticity with respect to headquarter
services. For this reason a comparison of the cross-section variation of organizational forms that is
based on the low-tech high-tech distinction cannot be made with their work.
21most suitable for some industries while the Holmstrom-Milgrom managerial-incentives
approach may be most suitable for others.22 This possibility would complicate every
empirical analysis that tries to explain the cross-sectional variation in organizational
forms. An appreciation of this possibility also raises an interesting theoretical question,
t h ea n s w e rt ow h i c hm a yh e l pt od e s i g na ne m p i r i c a ls t r a t e g y :H o wd oc o m p a n i e si na
particular industry choose between the property-rights approach and the managerial-
incentives approach in the organization of their activities? Or, more broadly, how do
they choose endogenously the structure of ownership and incentives? To sort out the
determinants of the organizational forms of industries together with an endogenous
choice of incentives schemes and the structure of ownership is a major challenge for
future research.
5 Prevalence of Organizational Forms
Our analysis has so far focused on the sorting patterns of ﬁrms into diﬀerent organi-
zational forms: outsourcing in the North, integration in the North, outsourcing in the
South, and integration in the South. How prevalent are these organizational forms?
And what determines their relative prevalence in diﬀerent industries? To answer these
questions we need a measure of prevalence. We choose the relative fractions of the
varieties of ﬁnal goods that are produced under these organizational forms as our mea-
sures of relative prevalence. We show in the appendix, however, that our results do
not depend on this choice, in the sense that other measures – such as market shares
of ﬁnal goods – deliver similar results.23
Following Melitz (2002) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2002), we choose G(θ)






for θ ≥ b>0.( 1 6 )
Under this assumption, the distribution of sales is also Pareto, a feature consistent with
22The empowerment of workers may also be an important determinant of the structure of ﬁrms.
Puga and Treﬂer (2002) and Marin and Verdier (2003) have developed general equilibrium frameworks
in which every ﬁrm chooses endogenously the structure of authority within the organization.
23See also Grossman and Helpman (2002b) for this point.
24k has to be large enough to ensures a ﬁnite variance of the size distribution of ﬁrms.
22the evidence.25 We use this distribution in the following analysis. As in the previous
section, we focus on low- and high-tech sectors.
5.1 Low-tech sector
Recall that in a low-tech sector no ﬁrm integrates into the production of intermediates,
because the outsourcing of components delivers higher operating proﬁts. In the generic
case depicted in Figure 3, ﬁnal-good producers with productivity below θL exit the
industry, those with productivity between θL and θ
N
LO outsource in the North, and ﬁrms
with higher productivity levels outsource in the South. Denote by σ 
LO the fraction of










/[1 − G(θL)] and σN
LO =1−σS
LO. The Pareto distribution



























.( 1 7 )
First consider the eﬀect of the Southern wage rate. A lower wage in the South raises
the proﬁtability of outsourcing in the South, by increasing ψ
S
O(η).I nt h i se v e n t ,( 1 7 )
implies a rise in the share of ﬁnal-good producers that outsource components in the
South. It can also be shown that the threshold productivity level θL is higher the lower
the wage rate in the South. The lower wage raises proﬁts from outsourcing components
in the South, therefore shifting upwards the proﬁtl i n eπS
O in Figure 3. But this raises
the expected proﬁts of entrants into the industry, attracting new producers of ﬁnal
goods. As a result the real consumption index X rises, shifting down both proﬁt lines.
The ﬁnal outcome is a higher threshold θL, which implies that a larger fraction of
the ﬁnal-good producers who enter the industry exit upon learning their productivity
level. Evidently, the lower wage in the South induces a reorganization among the ﬁnal-
good producers in the North that leads them to rely more on arm’s-length imports of
components.
The model can easily be extended to incorporate transport costs for intermediate
inputs. If the shipment of components is subjected to melting-iceberg-type transport
costs, then a fall in transport costs is very similar to a decline in the Southern wage
rate. It follows that lower transport costs lead to exit of a larger fraction of entrants
25See Axtell (2001) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2002).
23(as in Melitz, 2002) and t oal a r g e rf r a c t i o no fﬁnal-good producers who outsource
components in the South.26
S e c o n d ,w eh a v ea s s u m e df o rs i m p l i c i t yt h a ta no u t s o u r c i n gﬁnal-good producer
appropriates a fraction β of the surplus from its relationship with the supplier of parts,
irrespective of whether the supplier is in the North or in the South. Imagine, however, a
s i t u a t i o ni nw h i c ht h i sf r a c t i o nc a nd i ﬀer between the countries, and that the ﬁnal-good
producer now gets a smaller fraction of the surplus from outsourcing in the South (but
still higher than β
∗ (η), so that the condition of a low-tech sector remains valid). Such
a decline in the bargaining power in the South raises the proﬁtability of outsourcing in
the South via an increase in ψ
S
O(η). As a result, the fraction of ﬁnal-good producers
who outsource in the South rises.
Third, consider an increase in the dispersion of productivity, which is represented
by a decline of k. Since the expression in the brackets on the right hand side of (17)
represents the ratio of the cutoﬀs θL/θ
N
LO and this ratio is smaller than one, it follows
that a rise in dispersion raises the fraction of ﬁnal-good producers who outsource in
the South.27
Finally, note that the degree of a sector’s headquarter intensity aﬀects its relative







(see (7)), it follows that among the low-tech sectors those whose technology is more
intensive in headquarter services outsource relatively less in the South. Intuitively, the
less important are components in the production of the ﬁnal good, the less important
are the cost savings from outsourcing components in the South as compared to the
higher ﬁxed organizational costs of this activity.
5.2 High-tech sector
In the generic case of the high-tech sector, there are four organizational forms, ordered
from low- to high-productivity ﬁrms: outsourcing in the North, integration in the
North, outsourcing in the South and integration in the South (see Figures 4 and 5).
We denote by σ 
Hk the share of products that are supplied with the organizational
26In the U.S. manufacturing sector, the sum of tariﬀ duties and freight costs has steadily fallen from
11.3% of the Customs value of imports in 1974 to 5.1% in 2001. We computed these ﬁgures from data
available on Robert Feenstra’s website.
27This is similar, in terms of the mechanism at work, to the ﬁnding in Melitz (2002) that more
dispersion raises the share of exporting ﬁrms in domestic output, and the ﬁnding in Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2002) that more dispersion raises horizontal FDI relative to exports.
24form (k, ),w h e r ek is the ownership structure and   is the location of production of
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(18)
We again ﬁrst consider a lowering of the wage rate in the South. Lower wages
in the South raise the proﬁtability of foreign integration and foreign outsourcing. In
particular, (7) implies that ψ
S
V (η) and ψ
S
O(η) increase while ψ
N
V (η) and ψ
N
O(η) do
not change. It then follows from (18) that σN
HO does not change. Namely, the share of
products that are supplied by ﬁnal-good producers who outsource in the North remains
the same. On the other hand, the share of products supplied by vertically integrated
producers in the North, σN
HV, declines. The reason is that low-productivity ﬁrms that
outsource in the North are too far from productivity levels that make the acquisition
of inputs in the South proﬁtable. As a result, small changes in the proﬁtability of
importing inputs, be it through arm’s-length transactions or via FDI, does not make
the purchase of inputs in the South attractive to these ﬁrms. On the other hand,
amongst the integrated producers in the North the most productive are indiﬀerent
between integration in the North and outsourcing in the South. Therefore, for these
ﬁrms a decline in the South’s wage rate tilts the balance in favor of outsourcing in
the South. For this reason the share of ﬁnal-good producers who outsource in the
South, σS
HO, rises.28 Finally, the share of ﬁrms that integrate in the South, σS
HV,a l s o
rises. Evidently, lower labor costs in the South induce a reorganization that favors the
acquisition of components in the South, but it has a disproportionately large eﬀect
on outsourcing as compared to FDI. At the same time the unfavorable eﬀect on the
acquisition of inputs in the North falls disproportionately on integration. It follows
that outsourcing rises overall relative to integration.
A fall in transport costs of intermediate inputs has the same eﬀects as a fall in wS.I t
is interesting to note that the recent trends described in the introduction are in line with




O(η) is independent of the wage
rate wS.
25the model’s predictions about falling costs of doing business in the South. Feenstra and
Hanson (1996) point out that transport costs have declined and foreign assembly has
increased both in-house and at arm’s length. Furthermore, Table 1 suggested that the
growth of foreign outsourcing might have outpaced that of foreign direct investment.
Finally, as predicted by the model, U.S. domestic outsourcing seems to have increased
relative to U.S. domestic integration at a time of falling trade barriers (see Figure 1).29
Second, consider the eﬀect of δ
 , the share of output that a ﬁnal-good producer
who is integrated in country   retains in case it severs its ties with the operator of the
production unit of components. We start with an increase in this share in the South.
This improves the outside option of an integrated producer in the South in its bar-
gaining with the operator of the production unit of components. The better outside
option translates into higher eﬀective bargaining power, as measured by β
S
V.A s i s




V (η) without aﬀecting the slopes of other proﬁt
functions. Equations (18) then imply that the shares of products that are supplied
by ﬁnal-good producers who acquire components in the North, either via outsourcing
or integration, do not change. In this event, the fraction of ﬁnal goods that use im-
ported components does not change too, except that amongst those who use imported
components the share of outsourcing ﬁrms declines while the share of integrated ﬁrms
rises.
An increase in δ
N raises the eﬀective bargaining power of an integrated producer in
the North. As a result, integration in the North becomes more proﬁtable and the slope
ψ
N
V (η) rises; the other slopes do not change. It then follows from (18) that the share
of ﬁnal-good producers who outsource in the North declines, the share of integrated
ﬁrms in the North rises, the share of outsourcing ﬁrms in the South declines, and the
share of integrated ﬁrms in the South does not change. The interesting implication is
that the improvement in the attractiveness of domestic integration changes the relative
prevalence of foreign outsourcing relative to FDI in favor of the latter.
Third, consider an increase in the primitive bargaining power β.I tc a nb es h o w n













V (η). The reason is that an increase in β shifts the bargaining power in favor
of the ﬁnal-good producer, regardless of ownership structure. As a result, the ﬁnal-good
29As in the a low-tech sector, lower labor costs in the South or lower transport costs of intermediates
increase the cutoﬀ productivity level below which ﬁnal-good producers exit the industry in a high-tech
sector. This implies a higher proportion of exiting ﬁrms.
26producer ﬁnds it relatively more proﬁtable to outsource. In this event the share of ﬁnal-
good producers who outsource components rises in the North as well as in the South.
On the other hand, the share of ﬁnal-good producers who integrate declines in the
North as well as in the South. Moreover, the fraction of ﬁrms that import components
rises. That is, the rise in the share of outsourcing ﬁrms in the South is larger than the
fall in the share of ﬁrms that engage in foreign direct investment. It follows that an
increase in the ﬁnal-good producer’s bargaining power biases the acquisition of inputs
towards imports on the one hand and towards outsourcing as opposed to integration
on the other.
Fourth, we examine an increase in the degree of dispersion of the distribution of
productivity, as represented by a fall in the shape parameter k.I t i s e v i d e n t f r o m
(18) that a decline in k reduces the share of ﬁrms that outsource in the North and
increases the share of ﬁrms that integrate in the South. The eﬀect on the share of
ﬁrms that integrate in the North or outsource in the South is ambiguous, however.
Y e tt h es h a r eo fﬁnal-good producers who import components from the South rises,
and so does the prevalence of FDI relative to outsourcing in the South (i.e., the ratio
σS
HV/σS




Finally, we consider variations in headquarter intensity. In sectors with higher head-
quarter intensity domestic outsourcing is favored relative to foreign outsourcing and in-









for   = N,S are higher in sectors with larger values of η.30 E q u a t i o n s( 1 8 )t h e ni m p l y
that the share of ﬁnal-good producers who outsource in the North falls with η while
the share of ﬁnal-good producers who integrate in the North rises. Moreover, the sum
of these two shares goes up, implying that a larger η reduces the fraction of ﬁrms
that import components. As for the composition of imported components, we cannot
sign the eﬀects of η on the share of ﬁrms that import from integrated subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, (18) implies that the ratio σS
HV/σS
HO rises and, hence, that σS
HO falls.
Namely, FDI becomes more prevalent relative to arm’s-length imports. It follows that
in a cross-section of high-tech sectors the relative prevalence of integration rises and
the relative prevalence of outsourcing falls with headquarter intensity. This prediction
is in line with the ﬁndings of Antràs (2002a), who shows that in a panel of 23 manu-
30See Antràs, (2002a).
27facturing industries and four years of data, the share of intra-ﬁrm imports in total U.S.
i m p o r t si ss i g n i ﬁcantly higher, the higher the R&D intensity of the industry.31
6 Concluding Comments
We have developed a theoretical framework for studying global sourcing strategies.
In our model, heterogeneous ﬁnal-good producers choose organizational forms. That
is, they choose ownership structures and locations for the production of intermediate
inputs. Headquarter services are always produced in the home country (the North).
Intermediate inputs can be produced at home or in the low-wage South, and the pro-
duction of intermediates can be owned by the ﬁnal-good producer or by an independent
supplier. When a ﬁnal-good producer owns the production unit of components and this
unit is located in the North, the organizational form is one of standard vertical inte-
gration. When, on the other hand, the production unit of the intermediate inputs is
located in the South, the organizational form is one of integration with vertical foreign
direct investment. This type of FDI generates intra-ﬁrm international trade. A ﬁnal-
good producer who does not integrate into the production of components outsources
them to independent suppliers. Such a ﬁnal-good producer can outsource in the home
country or in the South. In the latter case outsourcing generates international trade
at arm’s length.
Final-good producers and operators of components production units make relationship-
speciﬁc investments which are governed by imperfect contracts. In choosing between a
domestic and a foreign supplier of parts, a ﬁnal-good producer trades oﬀ the beneﬁts
of lower variable costs in the South against the beneﬁts of lower ﬁxed costs in the
North. On the other hand, in choosing between vertical integration and outsourcing in
one of the countries, the ﬁnal-good producer trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of ownership from
vertical integration against the beneﬁts of better incentives for the supplier of parts un-
der outsourcing. These tradeoﬀs induce ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels to sort
by organizational form. We show that the equilibrium sorting patterns depend on the
wage diﬀerential between the North and the South, on the ownership advantage in each
31Controlling for several industry characteristics, Antràs (2002a) ﬁnds that a 1% increase in the
ratio of industry R&D expenditures over industry sales leads to a 0.42% increase in the fraction of
that industry’s U.S. imports that are transacted within ﬁrm boundaries. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at
the 1% signiﬁcance level.
28o n eo ft h ec o u n t r i e s( a sm e a s u r e db yt h ef r a c t i o no fo u t p u tt h a taﬁnal-good producer
can recoup in the event of a breakup of his relationship with an integrated supplier of
components), on the distribution of the bargaining power between ﬁnal-good producers
and operators of components production facilities, and on the headquarter intensity of
the production process.
A key result is that high-productivity ﬁrms acquire intermediate inputs in the
South while low-productivity ﬁrms acquire them in the North. Amongst the ﬁnal-good
producers who acquire inputs in the same country the low-productivity ﬁrms outsource
while the high-productivity ﬁrms integrate. In sectors with a very low intensity of
headquarter services no ﬁrm integrates; low-productivity ﬁrms outsource at home while
high-productivity ﬁrms outsource abroad.
We construct industry equilibria and use them to characterize the relative preva-
lence of alternative organizational forms. By relative prevalence we mean the fraction
of ﬁnal-good producers who choose a particular organizational form. Relative preva-
lence depends on all the features of an industry that aﬀect the sorting pattern of its
ﬁrms into various organizational forms. In addition, it depends on the degree of disper-
sion of productivity across the industry’s ﬁrms. Using these relationships, we describe
how diﬀerences in industry characteristics aﬀect the relative prevalence of various or-
ganizational forms.
Two results stand out. First, sectors with more dispersion of productivity rely
more on imported inputs. And moreover, amongst the headquarter-intensive ﬁnal-good
producers who acquire inputs in a particular country, the number of integrated ﬁrms is
higher relative to the number of outsourcing ﬁrms the more dispersed is productivity
within the sector. Second, the higher a sector’s headquarter intensity, the less it relies
on imported intermediate inputs. And amongst the headquarter-intensive ﬁnal-good
producers who acquire inputs in a particular country, the number of integrated ﬁrms
is higher relative to the number of outsourcing ﬁrms the more headquarter intensive is
the sector.
Our model has also interesting implications for the eﬀects of a widening of the wage
gap between the North and the South, or a reduction of the trading costs of intermediate
inputs (both changes produce similar outcomes). As one would expect, reducing the
relative cost of foreign sourcing raises the prevalence of organizational forms that rely
on imported inputs. Importantly, however, such shifts in costs also aﬀect the relative
29attractiveness of outsourcing versus integration. Not only does it raise the relative
prevalence of outsourcing overall, it also raises the number of outsourcing ﬁnal-good
producers relative to the number of integrated ﬁnal-good producers in every country.
This means in particular that it raises arm’s-length trade relative to intra-ﬁrm trade.
As is evident from these results, our model provides rich predictions about issues
of central concern to the quest for a better understanding of the changing landscape
of foreign trade and investment. Since we laid out the empirical motivation for this
study in the introduction, it suﬃces to point out in these concluding comments that
our approach helps to better appreciate the complexity of trade and investment in a
w o r l di nw h i c hﬁrms choose endogenously their organizational forms. It also should
help in designing empirical studies of the ever evolving world trading system.
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33A Appendix
In the main text, we measured the relative prevalence of diﬀerent organizational forms with
the fraction of ﬁnal-good varieties produced under each type of organization. In this appendix
we show that the use of other measures yields similar results.
First consider the case of market shares, i.e., the fraction of industry sales captured by










































































When the productivity index θ is drawn from a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter
k, the distribution of ﬁrm sales is also Pareto with the shape parameter k − α/(1 − α).
































O (η). This implies that, as in the main text, the prevalence of Southern out-
sourcing is decreasing in the Southern wage rate, in transport costs, and in the importance
of headquarter services as measured by η. Furthermore, because θN
LO >θ L, it is straightfor-
ward to show that an increase in dispersion (a fall in k) raises the market share of ﬁnal-good
producers outsourcing in the South. Finally, a fall in the South’s bargaining power increases
ψS
O (η) and ρS
O (η) when η<β , a condition that may or may not be more restrictive than
the condition that deﬁnes the low-tech sector (i.e., β∗ (η) <β ).32 When η<β , a fall in
the bargaining power in the South raises the market share of Southern outsourcing. When,
instead, η>β ,t h ee ﬀect is ambiguous.
In the generic high-tech sector, total sale revenues are X(µ−α)/(1−α)θα/(1−α) b R(η),w h e r e
32The inequality η<βholds true in the low-tech sector when β<1/2. This follows from β
∗ (η) >η
if and only if β
∗ (η) < 1/2 (see equation (10)).
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HO. This complicates the analysis relative to the main text, but
the results are similar.
First, a fall in the Southern wage or in transport costs increases ψS
O (η), ψS
V (η), ρS
O (η),a n d
ρS
V (η), while leaving the ratios ψS
O (η)/ψS
V (η) and ρS
O (η)/ρS
V (η) unaﬀected. It is straight-







all increase. It follows that global production sharing, as measured by the sum ξS
HO + ξS
HV,
increases, as does outsourcing relative to integration in each one of the countries. This implies
that ξS
HO rises and ξN
HV falls. The overall eﬀect on ξN
HO and ξS
HV depends on whether b R(η)
increases or decreases. If η>βand wN/wS is high enough, it can be shown that not only
ψS
V (η) >ψ S
O(η) >ψ N
V (η) >ψ N
O(η), but also ρS
V (η) >ρ S
O(η) >ρ N
V (η) >ρ N
O(η).33 In this case
b R(η) rises when Southern wages or transport costs fall. As a result, ξN
HO falls, whereas the
eﬀect on ξS
HV remains ambiguous. If instead η, β,a n dwN/wS are such that b R(η) falls, then
both ξN
HO and ξS
HV rise when Southern wages or transport costs decline.
Second, consider the eﬀect of δ .A n i n c r e a s e i n δS raises ψS
V (η) without aﬀecting the
slopes of the other proﬁts functions. Furthermore, if η is high enough, namely η>β S
V ,t h i s
also increases ρS
V (η) relative to ρS
O(η), ρN
V (η),a n dρN
O(η).I nt h i sc a s eξS
HV increases and ξS
HO
declines, while the ratio ξN
HO/ξN
HV does not change. The only diﬀerence with the main text
is that the market share of ﬁnal-good producers who use imported components now depends
on δS.T h ee ﬀect depends again on whether b R(η) increases or decreases with δS. As before,
if η>βand wN/wS is high enough, then ρS
V (η) >ρ S
O(η) >ρ N
V (η) >ρ N
O(η),a n db R(η) is
raised by an increase in δS. In this case the market share of importers is increasing in δS.
33In particular, η>βensures that ρS
V (η) >ρ S
O(η) and ρN
V (η) >ρ N
O(η),w h i l eρS
O(η) >ρ N
V (η) holds


















35An increase in δN aﬀects prevalence similarly to the the main text when η>β N
V .I n
this case domestic integration gains market share relative to both domestic outsourcing and
foreign outsourcing. As a result, the prevalence of vertical integration relative to outsourcing
rises in both countries. As in the main text, ξN
HV is increasing in δN,w h e r e a st h ee ﬀect on
the other market shares depends on whether b R(η) is increasing or decreases in δN.





O (η),a n dψN
V (η)/ψS
V (η) for   = N,S. Moreover, it also




O (η),a n dρN
V (η)/ρS
V (η) for   = N,S.A sar e s u l t ,
the market share of ﬁrms outsourcing in each country increases4 relative to the market share
of ﬁr m si n t e g r a t i n gi nt h es a m ec o u n t r y ,j u s ta si nt h em a i nt e x t .T h ee ﬀect on the market
share of ﬁr m st h a ti m p o r tc o m p o n e n t s( ξS
HO + ξS
HV) is, however, ambiguous.
Fourth, it is straightforward to show that an increase in the degree of dispersion reduces
the market share of ﬁrms outsourcing in the North and increases the market share of ﬁrms







HO are decreasing in k.





O (η) for   = N,S,a sw e l la sρN
O (η)/ρS
O (η) and ρ 
V (η)/ρ 
O (η) for   = N,S.A s
in the main text, the relative prevalence of domestic integration increases, both in absolute
terms and relative to domestic outsourcing, while the relative prevalence of foreign outsourc-
ing falls, both in absolute terms and relative to foreign integration. Furthermore, under mild
assumptions, the market share of ﬁrms that import components falls.
Using output of each organizational form as a measure of relative prevalence also yields
similar results. In particular, it can be shown that equations (19)-(22) apply to this case,





¤1/α replacing ρ 
k (η). The comparative statics are therefore similar to
those for market shares.
36